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This paper will look at the results of what has been termed “the crisis of modernism” and
the related rise of postmodern perspectives in the 19th and 20th centuries. It concentrates
on what is arguably the chief casualty of this crisis – human agency – and the social
science that has developed out of the crisis. We argue that modern and postmodern
social science ultimately obviate human agency in the understanding of what it means to
be a human being. Attention is given to the contemporary intellectual world and the way
in which it has been deeply informed by neo-Hegelian and other postmodern scholarly
trends, particularly in accounting for how agency has come to play little role in social
science understanding of human action. The paper also offers an alternative conception
of human agency to the commonly endorsed libertarian model of free choice. Finally, the
paper argues that this view of agency preserves meaning and purpose in human action
and counters the pervasive social science worldview that sacrifices agency and meaning
to powerful invisible abstractions.
Keywords: agency, free will (freedom), Hayek F. A., modernism, postmodernism, positivism

INTRODUCTION
It has frequently been argued (see, e.g., Gay, 1969; Outram, 1995; Beiser, 1996; Gottlieb, 2016;
Pinker, 2018; Williams and Gantt, 2018) that Enlightenment thought, as it matured from the
early 16th century and on through the late 19th century, exalted the rational mind as the
source of all knowledge worthy to be deemed real knowledge. The finished form of this
creative rational process was thought to be found in formal logic and scientific discourse that
could be shown to embody or pass the test of careful logical analysis in its structure, claims,
and conclusions. This logic test, in more recent centuries, has also assumed the form of
empirical demonstration, validation, or falsification. In our contemporary intellectual climate,
it seems that such empirical demonstrations take their most impressive form, in the activities
of the natural sciences and the technologies they produce (Wooton, 2015).
Rational science, as it developed, offered the promise of control over nature in the service
of humankind on such a scale that a great host of human needs seemed finally on the brink
of being met. As more human needs were met, the success of such control and technology
gave impetus (and perhaps even lent legitimacy) to a sometimes subtle and unnoticed turning
of attention away from human needs that had hitherto been largely physical and economic
and toward human wants, many of which became mental, psychological, and emotional, or
what we might term “mere desires.” With tangible needs largely fulfilled – at least in principle –
it seemed conceivable and legitimate to turn attention to the fulfillment of mere desires.
1
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In a sense, this historical success of Enlightenment thinking
has in every subsequent era contributed to the appearance
that the earliest promises of the Enlightenment, articulated
perhaps most famously by Renaissance philosopher Giovanni
Pico della Mirandola (1,463–1,494), might actually be fulfilled.
In his work, De Hominis Dignitate (On the Dignity of Man),
Pico della Mirandola attributes to God the following description
of our human nature:

forms of scientism, naturalism, skepticism, and atheism, on
the other (Olson, 2008).
By the early to middle 20th century, however, some very
insightful and sophisticated voices began to question, with
greater seriousness and sophistication than in earlier centuries,
the hegemony and even the relevance of the rationalist project,
and its ability to really make sense of all things – most especially,
its ability to make sense of our humanity (Hayes, 2009). Europe
had been the seedbed of the Enlightenment, and science,
technology, political philosophy, art, and moral theory all bore
the marks of the Enlightenment and its European cultural
context (Gay, 1969). Thus, Europe was not only the seedbed
of Enlightenment thinking, but it was also the bearer to the
world of the intellectual, political, and technological fruits of
that thinking. Unfortunately, despite the seemingly utopic
promises of Enlightenment science and philosophy, the late
19th through the middle 20th centuries saw unprecedented
turmoil and strife, including world wars that produced greater
destruction and human suffering than anyone, from the
perspective of the high point of rationalism in the 18th and
early 19th centuries, could ever have predicted. This led some
thinkers, beginning in the interwar period of the 20th century,
to begin questioning the aims and legitimacy of the modernist
project – arguing quite thoughtfully and persuasively that, for
all of its success in furthering our understanding of the natural
world, modern science and philosophy had failed to provide
answers to the most pressing moral and existential questions
human beings face, especially those regarding the very the
nature of our humanity itself. In short, Enlightenment modernism
had failed to safeguard the inherent meaningfulness of the
human world. Thus, a rich and penetrating philosophical
literature grew up centered on an analysis of the widely
recognized “crisis” of the modern world (see Sharpe et al.,
2017) and the resultant “malaise of modernity” that the issues
at the core of the crisis subsequently engendered (Taylor, 1991;
Gantt and Williams, 2018).

We have set thee at the world’s center that thou mayest
from thence more easily observe whatever is in the
world. We have made thee neither of heaven nor of
earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom
of choice and with honor, as though the maker and
molder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in
whatever shape thou shalt prefer (cited in
Cassirer et al., 1948, pp. 223–225).
In the following paragraph in this essay, Pico della Mirandola
expresses one other aspect of our nature for which, he suggests,
we all ought to be properly grateful: “O supreme generosity
of God the Father, O highest and most marvelous felicity of
man! To him it is granted to have whatever he chooses, to
be whatever he wills” (cited in Cassirer et al., 1948, pp. 223–225).
In this passage, written at the earliest phase of the Enlightenment,
we can see already uncovered the end to which Enlightenment
thought aimed to carry humankind, and to which, to a great
extent we still continue to aspire (see, e.g., Bellah et al., 1985;
Wilkens and Sanford, 2009; Tallis, 2020).
The progress of the Enlightenment project, as begun in
earnest in the 16th century and developed throughout the
18th and into the 19th century, surely raised the collective
expectations of the Western world. The power of the rational
mind to discover and to create in virtually every aspect of
nature and every field of endeavor seemed limitless – in theory,
at least, if not always quite yet in practice. Enlightenment
rationality was applied to the questions of epistemology, to
the subjects of natural philosophy, and to the dilemmas of
moral philosophy. Indeed, to many, it seemed that every human
question and problem would 1 day fall to the rational powers
of the human mind (Gay, 1969). The invention of increasingly
sophisticated methods of study, of observation and measurement,
drew out of natural philosophy, a set of practices, both
methodological and explanatory, that coalesced into the natural
sciences of the 19th and 20th centuries and subsequently
validated themselves in the form of the technologies of the
20th and 21st centuries (McClellan, 2015). Sophisticated processes
of formal logic increasingly held out the possibility of rational
certainty about the world and even about ourselves. Indeed,
it was not clear that there were any predetermined limits to
our capacity to know with absolute confidence virtually anything
to which we might turn our collective minds (Pinker, 2018).
Even moral philosophy, reaching into theology, underwent
transformations as the tools of rational analysis were applied
to moral principles and religious doctrines (Olson, 2013). The
effect in this sphere was refinement of religious argument and
new forms of apologetics, on the one hand, and more sophisticated
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

THE INTELLECTUAL LANDSCAPE
FOLLOWING THE CRISIS
The crisis we are referring to here was a crisis of meaning,
the inability to be sure about, or to find a stable ground for
the human meaning-making and understanding that provides
the necessary structure for pursuing science, philosophy, moral
theory, art and culture, theology, and for creating and sustaining
those social institutions founded on the rationalist tradition
that had dominated Western thought for the previous three
centuries. While the concept of “crisis” was primarily developed
through the writings of the German philosopher Edmund
Husserl (1859–1938) and likeminded others (see, Hewitson
and D’Auria, 2012) during the interwar period in Europe, the
origins of this crisis in meaning, and the larger perception of
the possible dangers of modernist rationalism, began to emerge
earlier in the 19th century, in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard
(see, e.g., analyses by Pattison, 2002 and Stewart, 2015), Fyodor
Dostoevsky (e.g., The Idiot), and Nietzsche (2002), but was
2
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perhaps most visible in the rise of such intellectual movements
as Marxism, Darwinism, and, slightly later, Freudianism. Indeed,
possibly the most sweeping and ambitious form of the
Enlightenment project of modernist rationalism is the work
of G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) in the early 19th century. In
a sense, Hegel moved Enlightenment rationality forward from
the original epistemic hegemony of the individual rational mind
to the postulation of Mind (or Spirit or Geist) itself as the
ultimate explanation of all that is – including human beings
and our individual minds (Dale, 2014). Hegelianism was, in
an important sense, the implicative endpoint of modernism
as Enlightenment rationalism. This is so, in large part, because
Hegelianism brought together in one grand system two of the
fundamental questions of rationalism (and really, of the Western
tradition itself): epistemology and metaphysics. The implications
of this grand system for the third pillar of Western intellectual
life (i.e., ethics and moral theory) have been significant and
far-reaching.
The 20th-century philosopher, historian, and economist,
Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992), provides what we believe is an
important account of the intellectual history of the postEnlightenment or “postmodern” period. In his book, The
Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies in the Abuse of Reason,
Hayek (1979) proposes that, although it is a great irony, the
dominant thought of the late 20th century, and thus of the
early 21st century, has been shaped by a conceptual alliance –
perhaps a coalescence – of the rationalism of Hegel (or, the
Hegelians) and the positivist thought of Auguste Comte (1798–
1857) and his followers. The common element that allowed
two such seemingly disparate intellectual traditions to come
together as a genuine intellectual force in the 20th century
and to continue up to the present time is, we argue, the
willingness of both traditions to postulate the existence of
certain powerful unembodied and timeless entities, constructs,
or abstractions, capable of exerting substantive causal power
over – and, thereby, governing and determining – events and
entities in the real, material, temporal world that human beings
inhabit. The power of these causal abstractions includes not
only a controlling force (once underway), but also a creative
force – or, expressed in terms more acceptable to proponents
of this explanatory tack, a “constitutive power.” This is to say
that, one way or another, the abstract, universal reality, or
realities (e.g., constructs) – which are the products of both
Hegelian and positivist thinking – make both things and events,
including behaviors, thoughts, and feelings, what they are and
how they are. All things come from – that is, all things are
constitutive of – a higher, more abstract, more fundamental
reality. It is worth noting here that the first and chief casualty
of this ontologic–epistemic system is human agency itself
(Dyde, 1894; Hayek, 1979).
To many students of the history of ideas, the possibility of
the extreme rationalism of Hegel and his successors coming
together coherently with the positivism of Comte and his successors
may seem unlikely, if not impossible. Hayek clearly understood
the strangeness of the proposition that these two schools of
thought should come together and dominate 20th (and 21st)
century’s thought and explanation. Nevertheless, he makes a
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

compelling case that such has indeed taken place. If looked at
from a slightly different angle, however, this proposition is not
terribly surprising. After all, both positivism and German idealism
are what we might call “theories of everything” (Barrow, 1991).
In substantive ways, both of these traditions represent the ultimate
project of the Enlightenment.
Taking one’s route through philosophy, one ends up in the
radical idealism descended from Hegel, wherein all is explained
by the clash (or evolution) of ideas, which move both themselves
and the events that constitute human reality. Truth and knowledge
may reside in the individual mind, but they exist supra-personally
at the highest and broadest possible level of reality. Hayek
used the term “supermind” to refer to this elevation of the
nature and function of the modern enlightenment conception
of mind, and its creative power and receptivity to knowledge,
to a cosmic level that affords – to those who can grasp the
system and its evolution – understanding of the whole of the
“system” of ideas at work and moving itself toward its own
ends. Hayek (1979), it should be noted also uses the term
“supermind” to refer to those individuals (the Intelligentsia)
who have been able to grasp the reality of the workings of
the grand system and who thus have the power to work with
it and further its inevitable end. According to this line of
thought, which has great currency in these early decades of
the 21st century, abstract realities are the real source and cause
of things. Thus, events and reality are known best and most
fully as, or by means of, constructs and structures that exist,
are on the move, and can be understood only at that abstract
level. The individual mind knows by contacting and apprehending
what is fundamentally an abstract reality.
The other grand achievement of Enlightenment thought is,
of course, modern science. And, thus, taking one’s route to
contemporary social theories and models of humanity through
science, one ends up in some form of positivism – or, at
least, positivists would have us understand positivism, or
positivistic science, as the end point of just that epistemic
certainty that has been held to be the standard of truth and
knowledge in Modernist thought (Ayer, 1959). Positivism allows
into the discourse and practice of science a number of powerful
abstractions, which serve as an endpoint of science and
explanation – even when they are not directly detectable or
demonstrable. Such abstractions include constructs, laws,
processes, principles, and structures. In positivist thought the
things and events we encounter in the empirical world are
best and most fully explained and understood in terms of
such abstractions – by laying such abstractions “over top of ”
the empirical events of the world in order to produce coherent
(typically causal) accounts of empirical events. The “goodness
of fit” of the events under the umbrella provided by the abstract
constructs, structures, and systems is taken as evidence for
the reality and existence of the constructs, laws, structures,
and systems themselves. Even when, as is often the case in
contemporary social science, one is reluctant to use the language
of “laws” to account for the human phenomena under study,
the “regularities” that positivistic scientific investigations uncover
are often taken to be “real” in some nontrivial sense, as the
facts of the universe, so to speak – certainly more real than
3
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the specific empirical events or relationships that we observe,
and that the abstract regularities are invoked to explain. Such
regularities are taken to be lawful in nature, that is, governed
by something very abstract and outside the world of material
reality and, thus, certainly “law-like” even if we wish to avoid
the language of “laws.”
The important thing to note here about this cohesion of
German idealism and positivism is that they both seek – and
make readily available a language of – causal regularity (or
lawfulness). In the most basic terms, (both Hegelian idealism
and positivism) see powerful unembodied abstractions as real
or names of things that are real enough to cause other events
to happen (or to be responsible for their happening) in the
material human world – as well as in the immaterial human
world of thought, emotion, and desire. A central question –
certainly what should be the question at the base of much
activity in the contemporary social sciences – is just how
these abstract realities are to be known, uncovered, or adequately
captured and controlled. The subsequent, and perhaps the
ultimate, next step for both idealists and positivists, then, is
determining how these powerful abstractions, once known,
can be controlled and deployed in the service of resolving
problems and, thereby, creating or manufacturing a better
human reality than the one that we have now – built around
individual human rationality and agency. Because both German
idealism and positivism presuppose that human beings are
mostly living in ignorance of the fuller reality of the causal
abstractions at work in the world and in their lives, both
traditions require a specialized degree of academic sophistication
and even intellectual transcendence in order to apprehend with
clarity the powerful abstractions they “discover” or presuppose.
Obviously, “getting at” or comprehending these powerful
abstractions is not easy; it requires deep and searching
investigation – something clearly beyond the capability of
normal, garden-variety human beings. Thus, the necessary level
of insight and understanding will be available only to an
educated elite who have cultivated the capacities to reach the
level of understanding in which the powerful abstractions can
be known and ultimately controlled – in the service of the
betterment of humankind, of course.

i.e., Absolute Spirit)” (McCormack, 2000; p. 102). It is in this
light that we commonly understand Hegel’s meta-historical
process of thesis → antithesis → synthesis.
What Hayek is suggesting is that this process is presumed –
by both idealists and positivists – only to be discernible at
the level of a “supermind” and in terms transparent to, the
supermind itself. Thus, true understanding of ourselves and
our world requires a supermind, actualized in and by an
educated elite whose consciousness of “what is really going
on” has been sufficiently raised and expanded to permit them
to grasp the higher order, systemic processes, and realities
that really move events and govern human affairs, and which
are opaque to almost all of the rest of us. Sustained deep
thought, intellectual acumen, and unyielding commitment to
rational methods and the findings such methods produce are
required to attain contact with the underlying, abstract reality
that constitutes the world, the grasping of which represents
achievement of true understanding.1 Presuming all knowledge
to be consilient, this will hold true throughout the human
sciences, including psychology, sociology, political science,
history, and across all social institutions, including family,
government, religion, and so forth. Thus, it is believed that
there is a great need for scholars and technicians who have
the intelligence to master the intricacies and subtleties of the
underlying (or overarching and ultimate) reality of the world
and how it is enacted within and how it governs human affairs.
These individuals, capable of rationally ordering, governing,
and explaining the world in light of their superior knowledge
and insight constitute the supermind, while almost all other
(non-enlightened) human beings, because they are oblivious
to what is really going on around them and within them –
and why it is really going on – are relegated to being subject
to the planning, oversight, and governance of the supermind
(i.e., the rational and scientific intelligentsia).
It is at the level of the supermind (speaking for the enlightened
body of scholars), and our confidence in its abilities, that the
seeming improbable melding of German idealism (as the
capstone of Enlightenment thinking) and Comtean positivism
takes place. On a global level, one sees some intellectual kinship
between the cosmic process of thesis → antithesis → synthesis
as the legacy of Hegel and the Three-Stage Theory of cultural
progress proposed by Comte (1988). Despite clear differences
in theoretical details, both systems necessarily entail the same
functional implications. As one of Hayek’s biographers, Ebenstein
(2001) notes:

HAYEK AND THE SUPERMIND
What is required for this type and level of understanding
requires invoking, in one way or another, what Hayek (1979)
refers to as the “supermind” (p. 159). For Hayek, the supermind
is straightforwardly derived from Hegelian thought. Any student
of the history of ideas will understand that there is a sense
in which Hegel moved explanation and understanding away
from, or “outside of,” any and all particular, individual, rational
minds and sought it in some sort of universal mind, Geist
itself. The world must, thus, be finally understood as a product
(in some sense) of a universal (or universalized) reason (i.e.,
thought). This process of ultimate reason that produces
knowledge, truth, and understanding is described as the process
by which “God comes to full consciousness of himself (becomes,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Hayek’s view of Hegel was similar to his perspective of
Comte. He observed the paradox of joining Hegel and
Comte, for the former is usually considered to be an
idealist, and the later a (material) positivist. There was,
however, little functional difference. For both, history
moved in stages above and beyond the individual and
All this intellectual activity also both presupposes and requires acceptance of
and allegiance to the principle that true understanding will always require
accepting the ubiquity and reality of abstract entities and explanation in terms
of these occult operative realities.
1
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removed from his will. What Hayek terms “historicism”
is the mistaken belief that there are laws of history as
there are laws of nature. Almost by definition, historicism
denies moral standards, for it denies free will. Comte’s
and Hegel’s determinism followed from their “peculiarly
unhistorical approach to history,” perceiving
determinism where it does not exist (p. 109).

not an empirical, scientific one (Williams, 1990). At the same
time, we never observe or detect “responses.” Rather, we observe
only events; that such event are taken to be “responses” is
equally a theoretical claim. In every common use of these
constructs in social science, the abstract “stimulus” has been
endowed with a real causal power to enable it to bring about
a discernible real-world event. This whole process is so common
and feels so natural in the social sciences that we seldom stop
to think that in this seemingly innocent process, we literally
have created an unembodied abstraction and endowed it with
causal efficacy in the real world. Furthermore, it is commonly
assumed that anyone not sufficiently educated to see the world
in terms of “stimuli” and “responses” will be in some important
way ignorant and unable to understand what is really occurring.
An excellent example of precisely this sort of thinking can
be seen in Milgram’s (1992) description of the nature of social
psychological inquiry. “The creative claim of social psychology,”
he writes, “lies in its capacity to reconstruct varied types of
social experience in an experimental format, to clarify and
make visible the operation of obscure social forces so that
they may be explored in terms of the language of cause and
effect” (p. xix). Similarly, he notes:

In reducing human beings and their history to mere
manifestations of the impersonal operations of powerful invisible
abstractions, discernible only by those who have been properly
trained to perceive such things, Hegel, Comte, and their
intellectual descendants systematically obviate a central feature
of human experience and daily life (i.e., agency).

AGENCY: THE FIRST CASUALTY OF
ABSTRACTIONS
Thus, the first casualty in the triumph of modern contemporary
social theory is, indeed, any meaningful concept of human
agency. At best, one is left with an empty Hobbesian concept
of agency as being able to do what one wants (particularly
in order to avoid unpleasant death or pain), despite the fact
that our wants, which are the defining manifestation of our
agency, are not of our own construction (Gantt and Williams,
2019). Additionally, one also senses strongly that similar sorts
of training and education are required within both neo-Hegelian
and positivist perspectives in order to fully “see” and “understand”
the march of progress each school of thought describes. It is
easy to see how and why post-Comtean positivists (including
especially Comte’s students) saw Hegelians as allies and a certain
kind of Hegelianism as part of the same intellectual project
(Hayek, 1979).
At the same time, Comtean positivism has long been credited
with introducing into science (including empirical science) the
concept of constructs, hypothetical entities that enter the empirical
process of science most directly at the explanatory level. The
role of constructs is in suggesting, in terms that “make sense,”
what forces might be at work in a particular (experimental)
setting and then in suggesting how we can account for the
results observed in a particular scientific study. Constructs are
also manifest in terms of the operation of the definition and
operation of variables in the events occurring during the
experiment. Often, constructs are endowed with real causal
efficacy at the level of models and theoretical explanations.
Neither variables nor constructs can be detected by the sensory
processes at work in the lived human world where most scientific
experiments, including particularly social scientific experiments,
are carried out. They are invisible to us as common human beings.
For example, one never sees a “stimulus”; one sees only
light, objects, shapes, etc. The status of these real-world things
as merely particular manifestations or instances of some
underlying stimulus or combination of stimuli is a matter of
conceptual inference. In other words, that such things are not
actually taken to be what they appear to be, but are rather
presumed to be examples of “stimuli” is a theoretical claim,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

The common view is that social psychologists derive
their experiments from life, and there is an important
measure of truth in this. But it’s also true that events,
such as the Genovese case, are the inevitable unfolding
of forces that experimental analysis will frequently
pinpoint first. Underlying the silly incident in the
restaurant was an important principle of social behavior;
by focusing on that latent principle, and extending it
through to a concrete dramatized experiment, one could
foresee certain inevitable results of such a principle
(p. xxxi).
The genius of social psychology according to Milgram, then,
is that it can “make visible the operation of obscure social
forces” that undergird and govern human action and experience,
and which are in themselves, unless discerned and exposed
by one who has been properly trained, invisible, and inscrutable
to the ordinary mind.
Although this example drawn from the social psychology
of individual behavior is quite simple, the process involved
and its conceptual effects are exactly the same in more
complex and higher order situations when large-scale constructs
such as “sexism” or “identity” are declared to have the real
causal power to produce real tangible effects – the agency
of human beings and their determination to do otherwise
notwithstanding. If the causal abstraction is, “there” the
resultant effect will occur. In this way, causal abstractions
ultimately obviate and thus destroy human agency. However,
we are assured by qualified and trained scientists who have
studied such things that variables and constructs are indeed
real and are the basis of the causal world we inhabit (see
Addis et al., 2019). Even when not explicitly stated, examples
of the presumption of the real existence of these abstractions
and their causal efficacy are abundantly evident in the
5
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theoretical and methodological language of the social sciences.
For example, it is present in the nearly ubiquitous obsession
psychologists have with discovering the “main effects” and
“interaction effects” that can presumably be revealed through
careful analyses of variance and other forms of statistical
examination, as well as in the extensive attempt to map the
magnitude of between-person differences as indicators of the
causal strength of these interactions (for a more detailed
account of this issue and its many problems, see Lamiell,
2019). The interactions of principle interest are the interactions
assumed to occur between various abstractions and the causal
effects such interactions produce are particular human
behaviors. In the social scientific literature, these powerful
abstractions are known variously as laws, processes, principles,
forces that work in and on us as “motivations,” “drives,”
“needs,”
“reinforcements,”
“impulses,”
“attractions,”
“orientations,” “attitudes,” “stereotypes,” “traits,” “characteristics,”
“schemata,” “scripts,” “structures,” “systems,” and so forth. In
simplest terms then, German idealism and Comtean positivism
have come together in the postmodern era due in large part
to their shared metaphysical commitment to explaining the
phenomena of human being in terms of powerful abstract
entities possessing causal efficacy in human affairs at every
level from the individual and internal to the external and
global – or even cosmic. As both of these late-Enlightenment
traditions came into contact with and were appropriated by
postmodern thinkers, one of the principle results was the
broadly defined “structuralist” movement – an intellectual
movement that seemed to hold great promise for the humanities
and the social sciences in the mid-1970 to late 1970 and
which profoundly influenced cognitive psychologies,
interpretations of Freudian psychologies, linguistic theories,
and sociologies (see, e.g., Williams, 1978). Perhaps the most
notable example of this movement was the resurgence of
Marxist explanations for less economic or political and more
local social and interpersonal phenomena. It is interesting
to note that, in the opinion of some, the most lasting
contribution of Marx’s philosophy was not in the area of
political or even economic theory, but rather in epistemology.
Marxism is perhaps the clearest and most accessible
manifestation of the confluence of rationalism/idealism and
positivism – only those trained to see the world in
neo-Hegelian, neo-Marxist structural and systemic terms can
really understand the phenomena of the human world. Thus,
within this contemporary movement, the epistemological task
is really the provision of training in recognizing abstract
and causally efficacious structures and systems.
Granted, many scholars have suggested that we are now in
a “post-structuralist” world, that we have gone beyond
structuralist accounts and models. We question, however, whether
this claim can be true since the essence of the structuralist
account is the reality, causal efficacy, and enlightening power
of unseen abstractions – be they structures, systems, processes,
or whatever else. It is also unclear just what intellectual
movements have captured the field previously held by
structuralism when so many structural explanations (such as
Marxism, some versions of feminism, Darwinism, and any
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

number of other “isms”) still enjoy such contemporary currency,
both at the theoretical and meta-theoretical level and at the
experimental level of variables, principles, and models of all sorts.
Finally, while many structuralists have traditionally eschewed
the language of efficient or Newtonian causality, it is difficult
to find any evidence that contemporary explanations of human
phenomena in the social sciences are not causal in any real
or substantive sense. In fact, we see no evidence that the
social sciences have ceased to offer explanations obtained by
virtue of their presumed ability to achieve contact with some
external rational order or reality, either by immersion and
sensitivity training or consciousness raising, on the one hand,
or by rigorous scientific observation, on the other. Here,
we propose, lies the seedbed of scientism in its many, varied
contemporary manifestations. Scientism embodies a thoroughgoing commitment to a metaphysic of powerful, unseen, abstract
causes – usually in the guise of materialist naturalism – as
necessary to any and all legitimately scientific examinations
or explanations (Sorell, 1991). Explanatory tacks invoking
abstractions with causal efficacy are not really different in any
important sense – particularly if one is concerned with the
possibility and preservation of genuine human agency.

HUMAN AGENCY IN THE
ENLIGHTENMENT AND BEYOND
As we have argued, one of the principle casualties of causal
explanations grounded in either material substances or abstract,
invisible causes is the possibility of any sort of meaningful
human agency (see, e.g., Hayek, 1978). The most basic conception
of human agency is “meaningful, purposive self-direction” (see,
e.g., Williams, 1992, 2005, 2017; Slife and Fisher, 2000; Martin
et al., 2003; Frie, 2008; Yanchar, 2011, 2018; Gantt and Williams,
2014). Human agency is, however, quite helpless, or at least
hapless, in the face of powerful invisible, causally determinative
forces. The more such causally efficacious constructs or causes
there are, and the more arcane they are – insofar as they are
available only to the intelligentsia or supermind – the less
agency and freedom there is available to the mass of humanity.
Ironically, it is not clear just how the intelligentsia themselves
might acquire for themselves any genuine agency even as
enlightened supermind, but it seems to be an article of faith
that when properly enlightened, one is able somehow to harness
the power of the causal nexus that is the human world and
purposefully further its inevitabilities to one’s own purposes
(a possibility anticipated by the ancient Epicureans). Perhaps
this is as close to human agency or autonomy as one can
hope to get in our neo-Hegelian modern/postmodern world.
It is worth asking, however, whether there is a path to genuine
human agency within the dominant metaphysical and
epistemological regime, given its allegiance to, or even, insistence
on, a “metaphysics of things” (Williams, 1990) – abstract things
possessing causal efficacy. A brief historical review is, perhaps,
the best way into this important question.
It is helpful to first point out that our contemporary conception
of human agency – conceived of as an autonomous free will – is
6
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a product of Enlightenment thinking and, therefore, a relatively
new concept (see, Taylor, 1989). We will say more about this
below. In the classical Greek tradition, what we would recognize
as human agency took the form of the active powers of selfdirection (Frede, 2011). While this is not unrelated to our
modern conception of agency, there are important differences
with the ancient view, but also shades of common understanding,
not the least of which is a fairly close tie between the powers
of self-direction and moral considerations – that is, the pursuit
of happiness in the form of the Good and furthering the
Good in ways available to us as the kinds of beings
we fundamentally are. We see here, of course, the roots of
what we recognize today as virtue ethics. As early as the
Pre-socratics, the unique human capacity for reason – solidified
later, in Aristotle, as the possession of a rational soul – provided
a capacity to recognize “the good” in its various forms and
even to be able to incorporate it into one’s person or soul.
In fact, there was an obligation to do so in order to have
what Socrates considered a life worth living, as well as in
order to be a good and contributing member of the polis.
From Plato’s metaphor of the rational charioteer controlling
the less than rational aspects of our natures to Aristotle’s brand
of virtue ethics, it was clear that human beings possess significant
ability to direct their actions and choices and even the
responsibility to do so.
This understanding of human agency and freedom of the
will, centered on the acquisition and incorporation of truth
and virtue in pursuit of the improvement or even perfection
of the soul, endured from classical Greece into the early
Christian centuries. Even as the concept of the soul, and
of its perfection, became more intensely individual over time,
moral responsibility remained a hallmark of human agency.
This view, however, contrasts sharply with the understanding
of human agency that began to emerge in the Renaissance
and which came into full flower during the Enlightenment
(Taylor, 1989). This emergent view of human agency is,
perhaps best captured in the quote cited above from the
essayist Pico della Mirandola: “O supreme generosity of God
the Father, O highest and most marvelous felicity of man!
To him it is granted to have whatever he chooses, to
be whatever he wills.”
In this short but heavily laden passage, the spirit of the
autonomous Enlightenment agent is clearly captured. This
spirit of celebration of individual autonomy continues in
entirely recognizable forms into the present modern/
postmodern period. First, human agency is associated with
felicity, with happiness. Now, clearly, the plain sense of this
association is that our having freedom of choice ought to
be a source of happiness. However, once admitted, it is a
very short step to the position that the function and purpose
of free choice are to produce human happiness – not just
in general, but in individual lives. We choose whatever
we believe will make us happy. Second, agency and freedom
are explicitly connected to the act of choosing. However,
choosing “whatever … [we will]” is not the same thing as
acquiring virtues and truth and acting accordingly
(Schindler, 2017). Free will is associated with the capacity
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

for acquisition – getting what we want, virtuous or not.2
And finally, the aspect of human agency that most clearly
connects with the Enlightenment, and to our own time, is
the notion that we can “be whatever [we] will ….” In Pico
della Mirandola’s words (cited above), “with freedom of choice
and with honor, as though the maker and molder of thyself,
thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt
prefer.” Here, it is proposed that we have freedom of choice
of a profound sort, the freedom and power to be makers
of ourselves, and, as such, beholden only to ourselves. The
nature, function, and power of the rational mind, taken to
be the crowning feature of Enlightenment thinking, could
hardly be expressed more clearly. The powerful rational mind,
which is the source of apodictic (absolute) knowledge, is
also the source of (absolute) freedom. And that freedom is
manifest as power, as choice – the assertion or imposition
of the individual will onto the world and even onto the self
(the presumed seat and possessor of the will itself).
This tradition is the direct source of our common, modern
definition of libertarian free will: Freedom of the will exists
when a person in a given set of circumstances chooses response
X but could have chosen another response, all circumstances
remaining the same (Kane, 2005). Thus, human agency in its
essential form consists in (autonomously) choosing from among
alternatives. Obviously, few would seriously argue with this
definition of human agency at the practical or pragmatic level –
we are virtually all aware of making many perhaps hundreds
of choices from among alternatives every day. Furthermore,
we are all aware that, in very many cases, we really did not
have to choose to act the way we did. We realize that we could
in fact have done otherwise. However, on the theoretical, or
analytical, level, this conception of human agency as free choice
breaks down (see, e.g., Williams, 1992, 1994, 2005). And, it
is actually quite easy to see why.
The essential defining characteristic of a choice qua choice
is that there is a reason for it. Further, the reason somehow is
sufficiently strong to “carry the day,” so to speak and determine
the choice. Absent sufficient reason, no choice would or could
emerge. Absent sufficient reason, any act would be simply a
random act – produced by entirely contingent factors that just
happen to be the case at the moment of “choice” (and the
contemporary worldview of the social sciences offers no shortage
of just such powerful abstractions as contingent causal factors).
So, the traditional analysis of agency really offers only two
possibilities. That is, either there is a deliberate choice based
on reason, usually referred to as a free choice, or absent such
reasons, the action must be understood as produced for no
intelligible reason at all. At the same time, however, to the
extent that reasons (and the circumstances that produce them)
are strong and compelling, then to precisely that extent, one’s
acts cease to be free. They must be understood as essentially
compelled by the strength of whatever reasons produce them.
If not, then why else would they have been chosen? We might
even say, “only a fool would act otherwise.” However, in such
Though Pico della Mirandola, as a man of the Renaissance, might certainly
have expected or at least hoped that our freedom would be used for good.
2
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a case, acting otherwise is not a free choice since the content
of the foolishness itself prevailed and produced the choice. The
conclusion here is that autonomous freedom of choice is ultimately
too elusive a phenomenon to anchor and embody our innate
human agency. It is also internally inconsistent and, thus,
impossible in the very sense by which it is defined. In order
to be a choice at all, there must be reasons for the choice that
prevail over other reasons. But precisely to the extent that reasons
are powerful and persuasive enough to prevail in the process
leading up to the choice, the choice ceases to become genuinely
free. It comes from the power of the reasons. This understanding
of agency is self-contradictory – fatally so.

free choice at the earlier level of considering reasons rather
than later on at the level of choosing an action in response
to those reasons because choosing among reasons, and evaluating
them, is the sort of thing that itself requires reasons every
bit as much as choosing an action (on down the timeline)
requires reasons. So, to keep this model of free choice – we may
refer to this type of deliberative conscious choice as Type 1
choice – as the sine qua non of our agency forces us into an
infinite regress of reasons and decisions, the result of which
is that we never arrive at any real point of the very autonomous
freedom we take to be the sine qua non of human agency.
Furthermore, this Type 1 choice is decidedly not the sort of
choosing that characterizes the vast majority of our normal
agentic lives. Very seldom in the course of daily living do
we stop, enumerate, and evaluate alternative courses of actions,
weigh them against each other, and then make a clear deliberative
choice from among the alternatives. This is in spite of the
fact that every life is composed of perhaps hundreds of agentic
actions every day.
The solution to this problem really does lie at the level of
our reasons for our acts, our acts of reasoning – and here
we must note that by “acts” we obviously include both overt
physical acts and mental acts, including evaluations, intentions,
and even emotions and desires. However, the solution does
not involve an act of choice of the sort that the modern/
postmodern powerful rational ego – which is our legacy from
Enlightenment thinking – is supposed to carry out. The
Enlightenment ego imposes itself, asserts, and exercises control
both upon circumstances and upon itself and chooses something
or another at the expense of others. Although this choosing
may happen at various times in the course of our lived experience,
even several times in a single day, every time it is the same
act of contemplating, deliberating, and opting from among
alternatives and imposing our will on the situation. A moment’s
reflection tells us, however, that for nearly all of our actions
in the course of our lives, our agentive acts of choosing are
not deliberative – that is, they are not the products of detached
contemplation and analysis of alternatives, costs and benefits,
etc. Most often, in fact, we deliberate not at all. We simply
do what we intend to do, what needs to be done, what the
situation calls for, in one way or another, and what makes
sense. This phenomenological fact requires us to search for a
type of agentive action alternative to any deliberative imposition
of the will. We propose that there is such a class of actions
and that these actions are more fundamental than the kind
of deliberative choosing that defines the character and actions
within the classical libertarian conceptions of “free” will.
It may seem paradoxical to say that the fundamental fact
of human freedom is not the imposition of a choice by the
will onto the world, but rather it is a sort of yielding, a yielding
of oneself to a perception or conception of the world – or
some aspect of our lived world. We may refer to this kind
of “choosing” as Type 2 choice. The idea here is that agency
entails a sort of yielding of self and a taking up of the world
in a particular manner. This often produces a sense of obligation,
of the sort articulated by the phenomenologist, Levinas (1969,
1990, 1995) and Williams (2002, 2005). As this yielding occurs

AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF
AGENCY
There is, however, an alternative way of understanding human
agency, one that is based on a conceptual foundation sturdy
enough to support it, but which, ironically, requires that
we essentially give up our understanding based on the hegemony
of the autonomous rational self, and its ability to choose for
itself and impose its will on the world, as the foundation of
our agency and our human nature. The conception of the
autonomous self, as it developed from Enlightenment thought,
seems to work well enough at the level of praxis, in civic
society, and in the law. Indeed, we all do seem to have a
capacity for self-control and self-mastery in most aspects of
our lives. The conception of agency as self-control or selfmastery, involving at times the deliberate imposition of will
and choice, allows us to live true to a moral code, care for
others, and succeed in most purposes of life. It is not, however,
the foundation or fount of our human agency – which agency
is the defining characteristic of humankind.
To see what this defining characteristic might be, we refer
back to our earlier example of making a “free choice.” The
problem with free choices being truly free is that choices are
actually based on reasons, and in any decision, reasons prevail –
even if, ultimately, the prevailing reason is one we might bring
into the decision at the last moment just to show that we are
“in charge” and can do whatever we want. That motive itself –
to show that we are in charge – now drives the choice and,
thus, renders the choice no longer a genuinely free, unfettered,
autonomous one. Thus, freedom must come into the model
of choice prior to any moment of deliberated choice – indeed,
often long before deliberation can take place or there can
be a distinct, conscious moment of choice. Agency, if it is to
be real, must enter this process of living and choosing at the
level of the reasons – or reason itself – not at the level of
the overt choosing.3 Agency simply cannot be understood as
Note here that it will certainly be the case that agency, at least in the way
we will develop it here, can be correctly described as a “sort” of choosing,
but of a nature and at a level much deeper and more intimately connected
to our essential being-in-the-world than any libertarian-style conception of
agency as rational, deliberated choosing from among alternatives could ever
be. This discovering and remaking of our understanding of freedom and of
choice will be developed in the remainder of this essay.
3
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in the lived world, it will most often take the form of taking
on or giving over to something some “reading” of the world,
some sense of settling into or granting of some sense or reading
of our situatedness – our being-in-the-world. We might take
on or give ourselves over to a person, an idea, or an ideal.
We might even take on or give ourselves over to a state of
affairs – empirically real or imagined – seemingly incumbent
in some decision with which we are faced. Whatever the case,
the agency comes not in the assertion of control (or either
self or circumstance) in the making of the decision, but in
what both precedes and follows from it – the actually taking
on of some aspect of life called for by the impending decision/
action or giving ourselves over to some implication or requirement
of the decision/action. This model of agency suggests that
decisions (or “free choices”) are themselves really incidences
of series of ongoing yielding to, of giving over and taking on.
To decide is to give oneself over to something, or to take
something on, or take something upon us. To develop and
recognize a “reason” is also to take on or give oneself over
to an idea, or understanding, or purpose. This activity of giving
over and taking on really has no starting point nor conclusion,
and it is as continuous and as long-lived as life itself. It is,
in fact life itself, lived experience. But unlike the deliberations
of the autonomous, libertarian agent, it is not supposed to
have a beginning or an end whereby one recognizes a choice
to be made, lines up the reasons, “freely” chooses an alternative,
and chooses – end of process. Rather, genuine agency (Type
2) is an infinite regress of taking on and giving over at every
level of life and really at every waking moment of life. This
is, quite simply, what it means to be an agent; there is neither
beginning nor end. After all, if agency had some starting point,
if it arose from, if it was called into being by, some non-agentic
condition, physical reality, or powerful abstract ubiquitous force
of one sort or another, then we would not really be agents
because our agency would be derivative and qualitatively
dependent (not free), and thus, it would lack meaningful
substance and meaning itself.
Ultimately, what the analysis presented here means is that
to be human is to be creative, and truly and always openended, to be the very site and source of possibility, purpose,
and meaning. As Ryan and Deci (2000) note:

by agentic action itself (Williams and Gantt, 2013). In the
realm occupied by meaning-making beings such as we are,
we thus make and remake ourselves all the time. The lived
world for us (for agentic beings of the kind we are) exists
primarily as possibility and meaning. The aspect of our
rationality – our legacy from Enlightenment thinking – that
is most important for us is not the cold, detached, logical
aspect of our human consciousness, but rather the evaluative
aspect by which we can discern and judge, by many lights,
the meaning and value of that which we have taken up and
that to which we have given ourselves over. The moral dimension
of life becomes more salient because the moral folds seamlessly
into the agentic. In the positivist rational worldview, the moral
requires its own set of rational and epistemological commitments,
residing apart from, and in addition to, the flow of agentic
living. And, thus, the moral dimensions of life are dependent
upon the rational dimensions of life. In such a view, one can
suspend issues of the morality of life pending definitive rational
judgments about “objective” morality itself even as one’s real
life, of necessity, proceeds within a moral landscape too often
“fogged in” by rational uncertainty, awaiting the rational certainty
that has eluded us now for centuries. This problem is at the
heart of the “crisis” literature of the mid-20th century as
we have described it above.
Agency, understood as the continuous taking up of the
world and the giving of oneself over to the world in evaluative
ways, is not to be understood as a mere attribute of the
modern/postmodern Enlightenment-inspired, will imposing self.
Actually, it is the other way round. Deliberative choosing and
will imposing are ways of taking up the world and giving
oneself over to it. Thus, the rational ego is the product of
and not the source of truly agentic being-in-the-world. An
astute interlocutor will no doubt observe at this point that
any act of taking up or giving ourselves over can be thought
of as a choice, made by a powerful rational mind as an act
of free will. This is true enough. It can be thought of that
way and agentic beings are certainly capable of acting and
choosing that way. Indeed, the temptation to actually see it
that way, dismissing what we have been saying about an
alternative view of agency in the context of the sheer weight
of the Modern rationalist tradition, might seem almost irresistible
to a mind imbued with and trained in the Enlightenment
thought. The problem is that agency as an act of deliberative
free choice, such as an Enlightenment ego might make, is not
supposed to end in an infinite regress – but, as we have seen,
it does anyway, as we argued above. Agentive acts as conceived
within the Enlightenment perspective are supposed to be selfdefining and self-contained, consisting of simple stages start
to finish – situation, deliberation, selection of an alternative,
decision, action, and end of story. However, the implicit and
necessary deliberation, selection, and decision about reasons
for any decision to act presents another cognitive cycle of
exactly the same sort as the decision to act itself (because the
decision to give nontrivial credence to any reason is itself,
indisputably, also an act of choice). In the end, then, every
definitive answer as to how or why a particular decision to
act was freely made will be question-begging, needing to invoke

The fullest representations of humanity show people to
be curious, vital, and self-motivated. At their best, they
are agentic and inspired, striving to learn; extend
themselves; master new skills; and apply their talents
responsibly. That most people show considerable effort,
agency, and commitment in their lives appears, in fact,
to be more normative than exceptional, suggesting some
very positive and persistent features of human nature
(p. 68).
Furthermore, as truly agentic beings, neither our past nor
our future is “fixed in place.” This is not to say that nothing
about the past is fixed and given, but that the meaning dimension
of the past and the meaningful tie of past to future – the
“thence” and the “wherefore” – are created and maintained
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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or presume a prior deliberation–action cycle of exactly the
same sort as the original one it is supposed to explain. However,
in a rationalist-conceived universe, explanations of important
things such as agentic actions are not supposed to end up
that way – that is, invoking a prior process as complex and
almost identical to the one they are supposed to explain. In
contrast, agentive acts understood as freely taking up into the
self or giving oneself over to ideas and possibilities are supposed
to entail an infinite regress because our agency is, as our life
is, constant and ubiquitous, influencing and being influenced
by both prior and anticipated future “taking up” and “giving
over.” Life itself is a constant doing, undoing, and redoing –
in the sense of being open-ended and thus agentic all the
time. And, thus, one’s past and one’s future are as fluid and
remediable as one’s present evaluative taking on and giving
over. For human beings, it is agency all the time and all the
way down. The reality of agentive action is in the very
hermeneutic circularity – or spiral trajectory – of life: what’s
done is done and can always be undone (or redone) for any
or all of a potentially very large number of reasons which
can always be taken up (or put down) and to which we might
give ourselves over (or hold ourselves back).
All of this is not to say that human agency, properly
understood, ends up in a chaos of random reasons and impulses
that would obviate any predictive power, as has long been
feared in the social sciences. On the contrary, the lifeworld
in which agency lives and unfolds is not chaotic. There is no
documented human drive or even proclivity toward chaos.
Chaos precludes reasons and thereby destroys meaningful agency.
What does become apparent upon careful analysis of human
agency is that genuine understanding of the behavior of human
agents will be available only from what Rychlak (1988) has
described as an “introspective theoretical perspective.” This is
to say that sense must be made of a person’s agentic world
from the perspective of the particular agent him- or herself,
rather than from an “extraspective theoretical perspective,”
based on theoretical assumptions developed and applied
generically and emphasizing constructs, abstractions, forces,
and meat and chemical. It is not to say, however, that there
can be no prediction of behavior. There may very well
be consistent patterns or reasons and actions across persons,
just as there are certainly patterns of consequences for behaviors.
Rather, the consistency and predictability of behavior are based
on the common givens and constraints and conditions of our
humanity, including commonalities across persons in social
and environmental realities. So, agency, as the central
manifestation of our common human ontology, will also manifest
itself in various commonalities of acting, living, believing, and
feeling. It should be apparent in this regard that agentic living
always works so much better, operating with greater breadth
and depth of possibility, in the context of a reality in which
there really is truth – most helpfully understood, perhaps, as
the knowledge of things as they really are in their unfolding
openness and meaningful possibilities (see, e.g., Heidegger,
1977). It should also be apparent that human agency works
not at all in the chaos that would infuse any post-truth world
such as is on offer in the currently intellectual milieu
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

(Gantt and Williams, in press). Agency requires a source of
truth and would be impotent, meaningless, and purposeless,
without it (Williams, 1994).

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON AGENCY
AS TAKING UP AND GIVING OVER
The first section of this paper sketched out the predicament
of the contemporary Western intellectual tradition, standing
as we do on that ground where one finished form of rationalism,
capped off by the German idealism descended from Hegel,
met another finished form of rationalism, and capped off by
the positivism descended from Comte. The result has been
the creation of a “disenchanted” world (Taylor, 2007), a world
where explanations of ourselves and our world are offered in
terms of powerful, unseen, and immanent – that is, constituted
by and constitutive of the inevitable nature of things – abstractions
and structures that have real causal power in human affairs
but which are discernible only to an educated intelligentsia
functioning as a sort of “supermind” capable of apprehending
and revealing these unseen abstractions, their manifestations,
and the phenomena they produce. The influence of positivism
in this intellectual activity can most clearly be seen in scientism
(Sorell, 1991; Stenmark, 2001; Williams and Robinson, 2015;
Gantt and Williams, 2018). In a similar vein, though not widely
acknowledged, the impact of various postmodern movements
can most clearly be seen in any number of (socially constructed)
structures that are responsible for human behavior in any
number of settings. While these movements hesitate to invoke
Newtonian-style efficient causes, they still often propose the
existence of certain structures and abstractions that are clearly
active in the human world and move us to act, think, and
feel in certain ways and serve as causal explanations for human
phenomena of various sorts.
We have further argued that lost in this philosophical
confluence is the flesh-and-blood human moral agent. The
German philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey (1989), recognized the
inadequacy of rationalist accounts of human action in terms
closely related to the argument we are making here: “No real
blood flows in the veins of the knowing subject constructed
by Locke, Hume, and Kant, but rather the diluted extract of
reason as a mere activity of thought” (p. 50). Similarly, Dilthey’s
colleague William Stern trenchantly remarked:
Of all the ways of thinking, the mathematical way is the
most impersonal. The application of amount and
number to personal being and doing seems to signify
the reduction [of the person] to an entity merely
comparable [to other entities], to a mere instance of a
stiff lawfulness, in short, to a thing. It is a fact that in
virtually every instance where mathematical methods –
measurement, experiment, statistics – have been applied
to personal life and experience as well as to cultural and
social manifestations of personal communities, such a
depersonalization has been the consequence. What is
truly personal – the wholeness and individual
10
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specialness, the inner origin and goal-striving nature of
doing – has been submerged, and persons have been
made over into mere pieces of the measurable and
countable larger world (cited in Lamiell, 2009,
pp. 189–190).

structuralism, as Hayek suggested, seemed like a good compromise
between rationalist scientism and chaos. However, over time,
structuralism has fallen out of vogue among many postmodernists,
and its most common replacement has been “discourse” or
“discourse communities” (McHale, 2015). With such a move,
though, we must still render an account of the nature, origin,
and ontological status of “discourse” itself, as well as the effects
of discourse and discourse communities upon real persons –
individuals and groups. Seeking to avoid the pitfalls of proposing
the powerful, individual rational ego as the source of human
identity and action, many if not most postmodern thinkers are
left endowing language, discourse, and community with some
subtle but powerful and unseen influence (analogous to a “force”)
on human thought, aspiration, and action. These forces, when
discourse about them needs a name, and in instances of applied
social science, as perhaps in social activism, are usually referred
to as some sort of “_____ism” (e.g., racism, sexism, ethnocentrism,
colonialism, heterosexism, classism). These “-isms,” we contend,
often end up being very much like the structures and constructs
Hayek originally warned us about and the structures and forces
that pull “postmoderns” closer and closer to the mainstream of
contemporary modernism of the Enlightenment of the Hegelian
sort.4 The arguments presented in this essay comprise, in essence,
a prolegomenon for the restoration of genuine human agency
in the experience of our humanity and in our accounts of what
it means to be a human being so that the best of what is in
us as the sort of beings we are can truly unfold.

Furthermore, in addition to the de-personalization entailed
by Enlightenment-inspired rationalist accounts, the models of
agency rooted in these traditions simply do not work because
they inevitably end in an infinite regress of causes and reasons.
The positivist tradition has not really bothered to construct
theories of agency because agency cannot really exist within
the causal world presumed by materialist naturalism or by the
constructs, forces, structures, and laws put forth in rationalist,
most post-rationalist, and structuralist accounts of any or all
human actions. Post-Hegel rationalist traditions have not bothered
to construct theories of agency either since agency is subsumed
by the inevitability of the onward sweep of objective systemic,
all-inclusive reality. Unfortunately, however, if there is no place
for agency in our self-understanding, then there is no space
or possibility for genuine meaning, purpose, morality, or intimacy
in the human world either (Martin et al., 2003; Williams,
2005, 2017; Gantt and Williams, 2014). Indeed, in a purely
naturalistic world of the sort asserted in rationalist, structuralist,
and positivist accounts, there is no space even for reason itself
(Lewis, 2001; Plantinga, 2011).
Postmodern positions that have found their way into the
human sciences have been somewhat ambivalent about human
agency. On the one hand, postmodern thinkers typically want
to reject naturalist explanations of our humanity and our behavior
because such perspectives clearly partake of the mistakes and
excesses of Enlightenment (modernist) rationalism, including
positivism and scientism, and thus risk losing track of our
humanity itself. However, on the other hand, most postmodern
positions, at least within the social sciences, try to insert something
into that space in modernist explanatory projects traditionally
occupied by laws, forces, constructs, and material biological
substances – or even reason itself. Postmodernist scholars of
human beings must after all account for the orderliness and
structured nature of the world. For a brief period of time,
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